In the international arena, only pursuing one's vital interests will eventually matter

PRIME MINISTER Narendra Modi’s much publicised visit to the Peoples Republic of China in May 2015 was termed “more in style but less in content”. The description, perhaps, underplayed the level of unhappiness amongst the cognoscenti. It couched the rising distrust of China.

Let me say that the Indian wariness of the Chinese attitudes had taken root during the six decades before the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India in September 2014. Xi became the first Chinese leader since Zhou Enlai to be feted at a civic reception. The relations, which “nosedived after the 1962 war”, had apparently improved in later years but not to extent where an Indian leader would make a public show of engagement with an antagonistic or perhaps a recalcitrant and intimidating neighbour.

But the public display of warmth and the chemistry between the two leaders looked quite evident even as they chatted continuously and looked relaxed in each other’s company during the visit to the Gandhi Ashram on the banks of the Sabarmati, and later reveled in a walk down the beautifully decorated riverfront. With “Gujarati culture and cuisine” it was bonhomie at its optimum. It was, perhaps, in keeping with the calculus of the new government at the Centre.

However, it was here that an explosion of sorts had erupted at the borders when the Chinese troops tried to force their way in, and the Indian troops confronted them. That was the infamous Chumar incident. The Chinese had allowed the incident to take its course whilst the Chinese head of state was in India and the belligerent posturing seemed to culminate with his departure. A well-known strategic affairs analyst commenting on the incident in his own high TRP media channel had tried to minimise the negative import of the incident by bringing out that after returning to Bejing, Xi, in his capacity as the chairman of the Chinese Military Commission had seemingly berated his army brass and even sacked the local army commander responsible for the incident. Incredulously, however, one could not obtain a corroboration of this news from other reliable sources, including the Chinese news agencies, leaving us no option but to conclude that the channel was doing the Indian government's bidding to play down the event. But China’s subtle message was not lost on India.

Within eight months, the Indian prime minister had trooped down to Beijing on a reciprocal visit. He first reached Xian, Xi’s hometown, the famous tourist town that showcases the terracotta warriors and where the famous Buddhist monk Hiuen Tsang spent his last years after his return from India some 2,000 years ago. This was essentially a suave demonstration by the Chinese visit planners to regenerate “bonhomie”.

Beyond this, the Indian PM’s visit reeked of a trade and commerce excursion and it was claimed that business was the main focus, with some emphasis on balance of payments. To summarise, the two countries signed an omnibus of 24 agreements covering: setting up new consulates; promoting skill development and entrepreneurship with setting up the Mahatma Gandhi Skill Institute in Ahmedabad; a mechanism for trade agreement; cooperation between India’s external affairs ministry and the Chinese Communist Party; cooperation between the railways of two countries; education exchange programme; cooperation in mining and mineral sectors; cooperation in matters of space; protocol on health and safety in rapeseed meal; relationship between Doorsarshan and its Chinese counterpart; agreement between tourism department of two countries; MoU on establishing India- China thinktank forum; MoU between India’s Niti Aayog and China’s Development Research Centre; cooperation in the field of earthquake sciences and engineering — oceans studies and climate change, geological surveys; establishment of state provincial leader’s forum; agreements on sister city relations between Chennai and Chongking-Hyderabad and Quingdao Aurangabad and Dunhuan; and MoUs for establishing Gandhian and Yoga studies in Chinese universities at Fudan and Yunnan Minzu, respectively.

Over and above , an Indian business delegation that had accompanied the PM signed deals with Chinese firms on renewable energy, solar cell and module manufacturing, offshore delivery centre in Dalian, telecom equipment, credit facility with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, integrated industrial park in SEZs, financing of power plant, sister port relationship, development of potential steel projects, solar power, industrial park in Kakinanda SEZ for high-end Chinese equipment manufacture, China-India Information Service Corridor Design Group and at least 10 more deals on equipment and technology.

But the biggest paradox of the visit from the Indian delegation was it shutting eyes to the severely problematic border issue, the construction of China-Pakistan express highway on Indian territory ceded by Pakistan to China, the issue of stapled visas to Indian nationals in Jammu and Kashmir, and lately, maritime forays into the Indian Ocean. The Chinese actions are, on a large number of issues, patently hostile in addition to border issues, the latest being a stern advice to Indian government received days after Indian PM’s return to India, to obtain Chinese concurrence before setting up offshore drilling facilities in Vietnamese waters off the South China Sea.

There was no indication in the public domain whether any or some of these nationally vital issues of Indian sovereignty were taken up by the Indian delegation, except for the PM sounding conciliatory in his speech during which he chose to remind the Chinese leadership of mutually-beneficial logic in resolving issues. In the overall assessment, we seemed as traders wanting to benefit from the Chinese progress. But this kind of support was possible from several Indian friends in the US, Europe and Russia for that matter, and which we did not take up in the past.

India, it appears, is reveling in an atmosphere of conniving bonhomie and using that as the tool for international relationships. Unless there is a strong belief that if India and China were to build stakes within each other, then there are greater prospects of resolving existing issues. But what seems to have been lost sight of is that in international relations, only pursuing one’s vital interests will eventually matter and they must be given primacy.